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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Suppose a defendant has killed three persons by rapidly successive
shots, and pleads acquittal for A's murder in defense of that of C.15
Proof of the missiles striking each of the three would be entirely
different, thus three indictments would lie on the "same evidence"
rule. 16 The act in relation to one of the three was no "essential" part
of the act in relation to another, hence three indictments lie on the
"essential element" rule. Conceding three transactions to have taken
place, each shot constituting one, the question arises as to what would
be the situation where one shot kills three persons. Some courts
have carried the "same transaction" test to its logical conclusion and
17
would, on a basis of previous decisions, sustain but one indictment.
The "same transaction" test then is flexible, leaving to the court
the definition of a single transaction. But the other tests are also
flexible, changing with application. From a practical standpoint the
courts in effect reach the same conclusions on any of the tests, with
the possible exception, as noted, of the "same transaction" test, where
several offenses grow out of the same act.
ERNEST W. EWBANX, JR.
Criminal Law-Quashing Indictment for Incompetent
Evidence Before Grand July.
The defendant moved to quash his indictment on the ground that
all the evidence (testimony of two witnesses) heard by the grand jury
was hearsay and incompetent. Motion denied, and, in affirming, the
Supreme Court held: There is a distinction to be made between inkill him, and by reason of bad marksmanship struck and killed B, whom he
did not intend to kill, the transaction, the assault with intent to kill A and the
actual murder of B are legally the same." Powell, J., in Burnam v. State, 2
Ga. App. 395, 58 S.E. 683 (1907) ; Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632
(1896) (the court draws the distinction here between a situation where two

shots are fired and where only one occurs) ; Hurst v. State, 86 Ala. 604, 6 So.
120 (1889) ; Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873).
-State v. Corbett, 117 S.C. 356, 109 S.E. 133, 20 A. L. R. 328 (1921).

" The court's decision rested on an application of the "same evidence" test,
it being held that a different proof was necessary in the case of each murder.
ITThe following cases represent the development of the rule in Georgia:
Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8 (1853) ; Holt v. State, 38 Ga. 187 (1868) ; Knight
v. State, 73 Ga. 804 (1884) ; Lock v. State, 122 Ga. 730, 50 S. E. 932 (1905) ;
Burnam v. State, supra note 14; see 1 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923)
§1064.

It appears in Lillie v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. Rep. 615 at 616, 187 S. W.

482 at 483 (1916), that in the opinion of the court, if two persons are killed or
injured by the same shot, a conviction of the murder or assault of one of them
would be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the murder or assault of the
other. The cases of Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 466 46 S. W. 639
(1898) ; and Wright v. State, 17 Tex. App. 152 (1884), would sustain but one
conviction on a plea of autrefois convict.
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competent evidence and disqualified witnesses as ground for a motion
to quash. Only in the latter case, and where all of the witnesses
before the grand jury were disqualified, should the indictment be
quashed.'
There are at least three rules with regard to quashal of an indictment on the ground of incompetency or illegality of evidence heard
by the grand jury.2 (1) Some courts hold that an indictment cannot
be quashed for this cause unless all of the evidence was incompetent,
and, if there was the slightest legal or competent evidence, the court
cannot inquire into the matter of its sufficiency. 3 (2) New York admits the total-incompetency test, but adds that in extreme instances the
indictment may be quashed also for insufficiency. 4 (3) A rule, which
appears to be increasingly favored, is that the court is without power
to go behind the indictment to examine the evidence heard, and consequently an indictment can in no case be quashed for incompetency
or illegality of evidence.5 Any other course, it is said, would destroy
the secrecy of proceedings before the grand jury; moreover, the
grand jury is an inquisitorial body, its finding is not final, and all
illegal evidence will be excluded on the trial of the case. 6 The latter
rule is followed in a number of states where statute provides that
none but legal evidence shall be heard.' The apparent effect of such
statutes is avoided by the desirable but tenuous construction that they
are merely directory and do not empower the court to disturb the
grand jury's finding.8
'State v. Levy,
200 N. C. 586, 158 S. E. 94 (1931).
2See Note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1479.
'Royce v. Territory, 5 Okla. 61, 47 Pac. 1083 (1897); State v. Logan, 1
Nev. 509 (1865); Estill v. State, 277 P. 256 (Okla. 1929) ; United States v.
Rubin, 218 F. 245 (D.Conn. 1914) ; People v. Duncan, 261 I1. 339, 103 N. E.
1043 (1913) ; State v. Coates, 130 N. C. 701, 41 S.E. 706 (1902).
"People v. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495, 80 N. E. 396, 116 Am. St. Rep. 621
(1907). And see People v. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395, 66 N. E. 112, 115 '(1903);
People v. Hess, 110 Misc. 76, 179 N. Y. Supp. 734, 739 (1920). Several decisions by the Federal courts have indicated that an indictment found on

"utterly insufficient or palpably incompetent" evidence may be quashed, but the
prerogative is more sparingly exercised than in New York. McKinney v.
United States, 199 Fed. 25 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) ; United States v. Silverthorne,
265 Fed. 853 (W. D. N. Y. 1920).
'State v. Chance, 29 N. M. 34, 221 Pac. 183, 31 A. L. R. 1466 (1923);
People v. Collins, 60 Cal. App. 263, 212 Pac. 701 (1923) ; Holliman v. State,
108 Tex. Crim. Rep. 92, 299 S.W. 249 (1927) ; Murphy v. State, 171 Ark. 620,
286 S.W. 871 (1926).
'State v. Chance, supra note 5.
'People v. Fealy, 33 Cal. App. 605, 165 Pac. 1034 (1917) ; State v. Chance,
supra note 5; Murphy v. State, supra note 5.
'Murphy v. State, supra note 5.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
The purpose of the grand jury is to seek probable cause for trial;
its indictment is a formal accusation and in no way a final adjudication against the defendant. On principle, it would seem that rule
(3) is the sound one. 9 North Carolina, until the Levy decision, has
blandly followed the total-incompetency rule.' 0 The language of the
principal case manifests an inclination to hold with the modern trend
that in no case can the court examine the evidence, but precedent
forbade such a course; hence the distinction between disqualified witnesses and incompetent evidence. The writer's investigation has not
revealed that a like distinction obtains in any other jurisdiction. The
North Carolina court failed to complete its jump toward the liberal
view, and appears to have established a rule quite its own.

J.

G. ADAMS, JR.

Criminal Law-,Sufficiency of Indictment Under National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act.
The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act' makes it a crime to sell
any motor vehicle moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen. In
Grimesly v.U. S.2 an indictment, drawn up under this act, charging
the sale of a motor vehicle with knowledge that it had been transferred in interstate commerce and theretofore stolen was held insufficient, on the ground that it was not alleged that the automobile was
moving in interstate commerce and that it did not further state that
the automobile had been stolen.
The Sixth amendment provides, that, "in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right-to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. ..

."

Congress, in order to limit the courts

in testing whether or not the accused has been sufficiently informed,
'As to fundamentals of the grand jury system, see 1 WIGmom, EvmENcF
(2nd ed. 1923) 20.
'When an indictment is found upon testimony, all of which isincompetent, or of witnesses, all of whom are disqualified, the bill will be quashed.
But where some of the testimony or some of the witnesses were incompetent,
the court will not go into the barren inquiry how far such testimony or witnesses contributed to the finding of the bill," State v. Coates, supra note 3.
The opinion of the principal case quotes the same extract, and points out that
since the Coates case actually concerned only disqualified witnesses the court's
statement of the rule to include incompetent evidence was so much too broad.
But if it be granted that all of the evidence heard by the grand jury in a given
case is incompetent, where is a logical basis for the distinction?
141 Stat. 324 (1919) ; 18 U. S. C. A. §408 (1927).
50 F. (2d) 509 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931).

